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Comments
Oscar v. Univerity Students Cooperative Ass'n:
Can Citizens Use RICO to Rid
Neighborhoods of Drug Houses?
Organized crime threatens the security of the Nation by terror-
izing, through physical and economic threats, the innocent
businessman and the individual citizen. One of the most perni-
cious threats posed by organized crime is . . . [the corruption
of] the hope of our Nation with deadly narcotics and danger-
ous drugs. It is time for us to muster our forces and fight to
save our society ..
I. INTRODUCTION
Drug houses blight neighborhoods and endanger residents;
2
however, neighborhoods are fighting backs against
1 116 CONG. REc. 602 (1970) (statement of Sen. Hruska).
2 See Monte R. Young & Michael Slackman, Cracks in the Laws: Officials Say They
Lack Tools to Shut Drug Dens for Good, Newsday, May 6, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, Omni File ("One crack house in a community can drastically change the character
of a neighborhood .... A constant parade of users and dealers marching in and out of
the front door brings with it increased burglaries, robberies, prostitution, traffic, noise
and litter.").
The drug problem is particularly acute in public housing.
The accounts of the residents paint a grim picture. Many said that crime and
drugs have become so bad in their neighborhoods or buildings that they have
become virtual hostages in their own homes. In many high-rise public housing
developments, the streets have come indoors; hallways and stairwells have taken
on the look of the worst avenues and alleys outside of the building. Local police
simply do not have the manpower or resources to keep up. When they direct
their efforts toward one development, the dealers and purchasers simply pack up
and move to another.
Drugs and Public Housing: Hearings Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1989) (statement of Sen. Roth).
3 See Judge Sympathizes with Crackhouse Arsonis4 UPI, Sept. 28, 1989, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File (Woman, enthusiastic about President Bush's anti-drug
speech, torched crack house.); Suspect Denies Setting Crackhouse Fire, UPI, Aug. 25, 1989,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File ("Neighbors cheered when someone torched
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drugs-America's modern nuisance.4  Historically, law enforce-
ment officials used nuisance laws to shut down bawdy houses and
gambling dens;5 today, they use nuisance laws to shut down drug
houses.6 Indeed, in several states, drug-related facilities are nui-
sances per se. 7 Additionally, when public officials do not act, pri-
vate citizens have begun to use nuisance laws against drug hous-
es.
8
Recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Oscar v. Uni-
versity Students Cooperative Ass'n,9 added a new and powerful weap-
the [crack]house.").
4
Without question, our Nation faces a formidable threat to its existence due to
our abysmal failure to control illegal drug use. Over the past few decades,
through inattention or perhaps self-delusion, we have allowed an intolerable situ-
ation to reach crisis proportions. However, it is important to emphasize that
mere numbers and pertinent statistics on drug-related crime . . . cannot properly
convey . . . the tragic sense of family loss, the stark element of fear and the
hopeless conditions which characterize many . . . communities throughout the
Nation.
Hearings Before the Select Comm. on Narcotics Abuse and Drug Control, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
75 (1989) (statement of Kimi 0. Gray, Chairperson, National Association of Resident
Management Corporations; Chairperson, Dept. of Public and Assisted Housing [DPAH];
Resident Advisory Board and Chairperson, Kenilworth/Parkside Resident Management
Corporation); see also A. Morgan Cloud, III, Cocaine, Demand, and Addiction: A Study of
Possible Convergence of the Rational Theory and National Policy, 42 VAND. L. REV. 725, 727
(1989) ("By any rational measure, the supply-side 'war against drugs' has failed. Only ten
to fifteen percent of the illicit drugs entering the country are intercepted and the most
popular illegal substances, like cocaine, remain readily available to the American public.").
5 See, e.g., Clopton v. State, 105 S.W. 994 (Tex. Civ. App. 1907).
6 See, e.g., English v. State ex reL Purvis, 585 So. 2d 910 (Ala. 1991) (Defendant
appealed conviction for public nuisance caused by conducting "drug hangout."); People v.
21020 Colorado Highway 74, 791 P.2d 1189 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989), cert denied, No.
90SC82, 1990 Colo. LEXIS 420, (Colo. June 11, 1990) (Defendant appealed holding that
public nuisance existed because of drug distribution on premises.).
7 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-13-303(1)(C)(I), (II) (West 1990 & Supp.
1991); IOWA CODE ANN. § 657.2(6) (West 1987); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3801
(West 1987 & Supp. 1991); Miss. CODE ANN. § 95-3-1 (Supp. 1991); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
19-1 (Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. § 105.555(1)(C) (1990); TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE
ANN. §§ 125.001, .021, .041 (West Supp. 1992).
8 See, e.g., State ex rel. Freeman v. Pierce, 573 N.E.2d 747 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991)
(Christian men's organization brought public nuisance suit in state's name against prop-
erty owner conducting drug activities.); Reynolds Holding, Rooming House Is a 'Nuisance,'
Neighbors Tell Court in SF, S.F. CHRON., May 15, 1991, at A15 (Thirty-seven neighbors from
a San Francisco neighborhood sued the owner of a rooming house, in small claims
court, which allegedly operated as a public nuisance because of drug activity. Each plain-
tiff claimed $5000 in damages.); Marja Mills, Court Shuts Drug House for a Year, CHIC.
TRIB., November 2, 1990, at 1 (Association of Chicago neighborhoods sued a drug house
for public nuisance and succeeded with a one year abatement.).
9 939 F.2d 808 (9th Cir. 1991).
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on to the war on drugs. In Oscar, a group of apartment tenants
sued their neighbors, alleging the neighbors' drug dealing activi-
ties interfered with the use and enjoyment of the tenants' proper-
ty. The tenants brought their claim under the Racketeer Influ-
enced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 10 which allows re-
covery of treble damages and attorneys' fees for an injury to busi-
ness or property which is caused by a racketeering activity." In
Oscar, the district court dismissed the suit because plaintiffs failed
to show that defendants' activities caused an injury to their lease-
hold."2 A panel of the Ninth Circuit partly' reversed the district
court's decision." The Ninth Circuit later vacated the panel's
opinion and will rehear the case en banc. 4 Part I of this Com-
ment introduces drug houses as nuisances. Part II reviews the facts
and holding of the Oscar decision. Part III discusses RICO and its
legislative history. Part IV analyzes the RICO standing require-
ments at issue in Oscar, and Part V analyzes Oscar's dissent and the
application of California nuisance law to Oscar. Part VI urges the
Ninth Circuit to affirm the Oscar panel's holding.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING:
OsCAR V. UNJVERSITY STUDENTS COOPERATIVE Ass'N
Tenants in nearby apartment buildings sued the University
Students Cooperative Association and certain residents of
Barrington Hall in Berkeley, California. 5 The tenants alleged that
Barrington Hall residents conducted drug activities which inter-
fered with the use and -enjoyment of the tenants' leasehold.'6
The defendants' alleged activities included drug distribution and
drug use.17 In fact, Barrington Hall was reputedly the "last bas-
10 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
11 Id. § 1964(c).
12 Oscar, 939 F.2d at 810.
13 Id. at 814. The Ninth Circuit panel found certain of the alleged injuries were not
caused by the racketeering conduct. Id. at 813.
14 Oscar v. University Students Coop. Ass'n., No. 90-15750, 1992 WL 3260 (9th Cir.
Jan. 10, 1992) (en banc).
15 Oscar v. University Students Coop. Ass'n, 939 F.2d 808, 809 (9th Cir. 1991).
16 Id.
17 Id. at 810 (citations omitted). The plaintiffs further alleged that many individuals
and enterprises operated out of Barrington Hall. As a point of interest, examples of the
individuals' names include "Mushroom Dave," "Icepick Al," "Onngh Yanngh," and
"Marybeth (a.k.a. Scarymeth)." Id. at 812-13.
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tion of [the] sixties counterculture" 8 and was known nationally
as a "drug den and anarchist household."" The plaintiffs
"claim[ed] that the co-op's residents conducted drug deals and
posted lookouts in front of plaintiff's apartments bothering them
and making it look like they, too, were dealing drugs; and that
Barrington's residents . .. regularly dumped the bodies of persons
suffering drug overdoses onto the sidewalks near neighboring
apartments. "2
The district court dismissed plaintiffs' complaint for lack of
causation, 21 but the Ninth Circuit partly reversed the decision.
22
The Ninth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs' leasehold was a suffi-
cient property interest23 to satisfy the RICO standing requirement
of an injury to business or property.2 4 The court further held
that the residents' drug activities directly caused injury to
plaintiffs' property by interfering with the use and enjoyment of
the leasehold25 and remanded for trial.26 However, the Ninth
Circuit then vacated this decision to rehear it en banc.
27
III. RICO AND ITS LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
In 1970, Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act
(OCCA) in which Title IX is the Racketeering Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). RICO sought the "eradication
18 Id. at 809.
19 Id. (citing Sam Whiting, The Co-Op That Chaos Kiued, S.F. CHRON., April 9, 1990,
at B3). Allegedly, Barrington Hall residents led an "alternative" lifestyle featuring nude
dinners with themes such as "Satan's Village Wine Dinner and the Cannibal Wine Din-
ner-the latter complete with body-part shaped food." Id. at 810 (citing Whiting, supra, at
B4). These and other activities brought Barrington Hall to the attention of the media
and police. See, e.g., Debra Holtz, UC Student Housing Co-Op ins Fight to Evict Tenants,
S.F. CHRON., March 23, 1990, at A4 ("In the past three weeks, one resident died after
falling from the roof of the building and a riot culminated in violent clashes with police
and extensive property damage."); Jim H. Zamora, Barrington Hall Once Hotbed of UC
Radicalism, Closes, L.A. TIMEs, April 10, 1990, at P3 (Confrontation between police and
500 people erupts at Barrington Hall.); The Statm, LA. TIMEs, October 18, 1987, at 2
(Barrington Hall attracted attention when seven people were taken to the hospital after
consuming LSD-spiked punch.).
20 Oscar, 939 F.2d at 810.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 814.
23 Id. at 811.
24 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
25 Oscar, 939 F.2d at 810.
26 Id. at 814.
27 Oscar v. University Students Coop. Ass'n, No. 90-15750, 1992 WL 3260 (9th Cir.
Jan. 10, 1992) (en banc).
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of organized crime,... by strengthening the legal tools in the
evidence-gathering process, by establishing new penal prohibitions,
and by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to deal
with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized
crime. "28 Congress provided broad sanctions under RICO includ-
ing "imprisonment, forfeiture, injunctions, and treble damage
relief-for 'person[s] injured' in their 'business or property' by
violations of the statute."' However, RICO does not apply solely
to * organized -criminals. °  Rather, RICO prohibits activities
characteristic of organized crime, not the status of being a mem-
ber of an organized criminal enterprise."' Therefore, RICO has a
28 Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub L. No. 91-452,. 84 Stat. 922, 922-23
(1970). The Congressional Statement of Findings and Purpose .provided in part:
(1) organized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified,
and widespread activity that annually drains billions of dollars from America's
economy by unlawful conduct and the illegal use of force, fraud, and corrup-
tion; (2) organized crime derives a major portion of its power through money
obtained from such illegal endeavors as syndicated gambling, loan sharking, the
theft and fencing of property, the importation and distribution of narcotics and
other dangerous drugs, and other forms of social exploitation; (3) this money
and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and
labor unions and to subvert and' to corrupt our democratic processes; (4) orga-
nized crime activities in the United States weaken the stability of the Nation's
economic system, harm innocent investors and competing organizations, interfere
with free competition, seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce, threat-
en the domestic security, and undermine the general welfare of the Nation and
its citizens; and (5) organized crime continues to grow because of defects in the
evidence-gathering process of the law inhibiting the development of the legally
admissible evidence necessary to bring criminal and other sanctions or remedies
to bear on the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime and be-
cause the sanctions and remedies available to the Government are unnecessarily
limited in scope and impact.
Id.
29 G. Robert Blakey, Foreword: Debunking RICO's Myriad Myths, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.
701, 703 (1990) (citations omitted).
30 H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 248 (1989) ("Congress . . .
chose to enact a more general statute, one which, although it had organized crime as its
focus, was not limited in application to organized crime."). Also,
[p]rivate civil, actions under the statute are [not] being brought.., solely
against the archetypal, intimidating mobster. Yet this defect-if defect it is-is inher-
ent in the statute as written, and its correction must lie with Congress. It is not.
for the judiciary to eliminate the private action in situations where Congress has
provided it simply because plaintiffs are not taking advantage of it in its more
difficult application.
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 500 (1985) (citations omitted).
31 See Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1063 (8th Cir. 1982) ("We are convinced that
the better reasoned approach is one which rejects any attempt to interpret RICO as
creating a status offense aimed only at organized crime in any colloquial sense of that
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broader reach than its name indicates.3 2 Additionally, a majority
of states have adopted "Little RICO" statutes which combat orga-
nized crime activities.s
IV. THE OSCAR COURT'S ANALisIS
OF RICO STANDING REQUIREMENTS
A. Injury to Property
The Oscar plaintiffs sued for recovery under the RICO civil
remedy provision. The elements of a civil RICO claim' are (1)
an injury to business or property (2) by reason of (3) a pattern of
phrase."); G. Robert Blakey & Scott D. Cessar, Equitable Relief Under Civil RICO: Reflections
on Religious Technology Center v. Wollerscheim: Will Civil RICO Be Effective Against White-
Collar Crime?, 62 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 526, 534 (1987); Betty Gloss, Note, The Continuing
Conflict Over Limitations on RICO's Civil Injury Element, 20 VAL. U. L. REV. 531, 558 (1986).
32 In fact, Congress mandated that the courts construe RICO broadly. Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub L. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970). See G.
Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO): Aasic
Concepts - Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1031-32 (1980) (supporting
idea that RICO should be construed broadly). Additionally, see G. Robert Blakey, The
RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L REV.
237, 249-80 (1982) for a comprehensive analysis of RICO's legislative history.
33 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2301 to -2317 (1989 & Supp. 1991); CAL. PENAL
CODE §§ 186-186.8 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-17-101 to -
109 (West 1990 & Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-393 to -403 (West 1985);
DEL CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1501-1511 (1987 & Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 895.01-
.09 (West Supp. 1991); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-14-1 to -15 (Michie 1988 & Supp. 1991);
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 842-1 to -12 (1985 & Supp. 1991); IDAHO CODE § 18-7801 to -7805
(1987 & Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 56-1/2 11 1651-1659 (Smith-Hurd 1985 &
Supp. 1991); IND. CODE §§ 35-45-6-1 to -2 (Supp. 1991); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15:1351-
:1356 (West Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.902-.912 (West Supp. 1991); MIss.
CODE ANN. §§ 97-43-1 to -11 -(Supp. 1990); NEX. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 207.350-.520 (Michie
1986 & Supp. 1991); N.J. REv. STAT. §§ 2C:41-1 to :41-6.2 (West 1982 & Supp. 1991);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-42-1 to -6 (Michie 1989 & Supp. 1991); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§
460.00-.80 (McKinney 1989); N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 75D-1 to -14 (1990); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 12.01-06.1 to -06.8 (1985 & Supp. 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2923.31-.36 (An-
derson 1987 & Supp. 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1401-1419 (West Supp. 1991);
OR. REv. STAT. §§ 166.715-.735 (1990 & Supp. 1990); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 911
(1983 & Supp. 1991); RI. GEN. LAws §§ 7-15-1 to -11 (1985 & Supp. 1991); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 76-10-1601 to -1609 (1990 & Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9A.82.001-
.904 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 946.80-.87 (West 1991); see also
Douglas Abrams, Civil Rico's Cause of Action: The Landscape After Sedima, 12 TuL. MAR. LJ.
19, 24 n.29 (1987); G. Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of the Myths That
Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO and the Various Proposals for Reform: "Mother of God-Is This the
End of RICO?", 43 VAND. L. REv. 851, 988-1011 (1990).
34 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988) provides "[a]ny person injured in his business or
property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any
appropriate United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sus-
tains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."
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racketeering 5 (4) which involves a violation of section 1 9 6 2 ."s
35 A full discussion of the pattern requirement is beyond the scope of this Com-
ment. The Oscar court's only reference to the pattern requirement was that the Oscar
parties agreed that the "repeated sales of narcotics . . . amounted to a 'pattern of racke-
teering activity.'" Oscar v. University Students Coop. Ass'n, 939 F.2d 808, 810 (9th Cir.
1991). With regard to the pattern requirement, in H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989), the Court stated, "RICO's legislative history reveals
Congress' intent that to prove a pattern of racketeering activity a plaintiff or prosecutor
must show that the racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose
a threat of continued criminal authority." Further, RICO defines a pattern of racketeering
as "at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective
date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within 10 years . . . after the com-
mission of a prior act of racketeering." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988). Racketeering activity
is
(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnaping, gambling, arson, robbery,
bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter or dealing in narcotics or other
dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by impris-
onment for more than one year.. . . (D) any offense involving fraud connected
with a case under title 11, fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manu-
facture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing




(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income de-
rived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through
collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a princi-
pal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or in-
vest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such
income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of,
any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce ...
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering
activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly
or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or
the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any
enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign com-
merce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
enterprises's affhirs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of
unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the
provisions of subsection (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988); see also DOUGLAS E. ABRAMs, THE LAW OF CiItL RICO 17
(1991).
An enterprise is "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or other legal
entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal enti-
ty." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988). Full analysis of the enterprise requirement is also be-
yond the scope of this Comment. The court's only reference to the enterprise require-
ment was that "[p]laintiffs allege precisely the type of conduct RICO was meant to deter-
the continuous operation of a drug distribution enterprise." Oscar v. University Students
805
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Essentially, the Oscar controversy concerns the standing required to
bring a civil RICO suit. The Oscar controversy raises two issues: (1)
Do plaintiffs have a property interest sufficient to satisfy the sec-
tion 1964(c) requirement; and (2) Did defendants' conduct cause
the injury to plaintiffs' property?
In Sedima, S.P.tRL. v. Imrex Co., 7 the Supreme Court stated
that a "plaintiff only has standing if, and can only recover to the
extent that, he has been injured in his business or property by the
conduct constituting the violation."' As an initial matter, plain-
tiffs must allege the existence of a property interest to have stand-
ing under RICO. Unfortunately, RICO does not define property,
and civil RICO cases rarely raise the issue of whether a property
interest exists. This case law silence likely stems from the fact that
the parties do not dispute the existence of a property right.3 9
Because RICO does not define property, the Oscar court
looked to state law to determine if a property interest existed.4"
Indeed, property interests "are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an in-
dependent source such as state law .
Coop. Ass'n, 939 F.2d 808, 813 (9th Cir. 1991).
For an in-depth analysis of the RICO enterprise requirement see ABRAMs, supra, at
173-258 (1991). See generally Michael A. Gardiner, The Enterprise Requirement: Getting to the
Heart of Civil RICO, 1988 Wis. L. REv. 663 (1988); Michael Goldsmith, RICO and Enterprise
Criminality: A Response to Gerard E. Lynch, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 774 (1988).
37 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
38 1d. at 498.
39 In the following RICO cases, courts found that the pleadings properly alleged
property was damaged without analyzing whether a property interest existed: Northeast
Women's Ctr., Inc. v. McMonagle, 868 F.2d 1342, 1349 (3d Cir.) (medical equipment),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989); Miller v. Glen & Helen Aircraft, Inc., 777 F.2d 496,
498-99 (9th Cir. 1985) (depleted insurance proceeds); R.A.G.S. Coutoure, Inc. v. Hyatt,
774 F.2d 1350, 1354 (5th Cir. 1985) ("business interruptions and expenses"); Bankers
Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 741 F.2d 511, 516 (2d Cir. 1984) (monetary loss), vacated and
remanded, 473 U.S. 922 (1985), on remand, 859 F.2d 1096 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490
U.S. 1007 (1989); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1058 (8th Cir. 1982) (reduced value
of contract), rev'd in part on other grounds and affd in part en ban4 710 F.2d 1361 (8th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983); Georgia Gulf Corp. v. Ward, 701 F. Supp.
1556, 1559 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (lost profits); Wang Lab., Inc. v. Burts, 612 F. Supp. 441,
444 (D. Md. 1984) ("business reputation and loss of customer goodwill"); Cuzzupe v.
Paparone Realty Co., 596 F. Supp. 988, 990 (D.N.J. 1984) (Defendants conceded "injury
to land[,] . . . diminution in market value of property[,J . .. [and] loss of use ,of prop-
erty" are recoverable.).
40 Oscar v. University Students Coop. Ass'n, 939 F.2d 808, 810-11 (9th Cir. 1991).
41 Courts have looked to state law to determine whether a property interest existed
in other federal areas. See Ruckelhaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1001 (1984) (deter-
mining if trade secret was property for purposes of the taking clause, the court looked to
state law) (citing Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155, 161 (1980)
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Furthermore, federal courts have looked to state law for inter-
pretive guidance in other RICO areas. For example, if a corpora-
tion is injured by a racketeering activity and its stock value plum-
mets, federal courts have looked to state corporate law to deter-
mine whether a shareholder has a cause of action against the
racketeers for a diminution in stock value or whether the cause of
action lies solely with the corporation.42 In Leach v. Federal Deposit
Ins. Corp.,43 the court stated:
this incorporation of state law into federal law (RICO standing
in regard to shareholders) implicates a serious problem of
uniformity of federal law throughout the states. However, on
balance, the incorporation of state law to determine whether a
shareholder has been injured under RICO is preferable to
generating federal common law in this area. Any definition of
the term property, an inherently state law-related term, should
look to state law."
The Third Circuit reached a similar result on the issue of
shareholder standing: "Unless state law on the issue of the deriva-
tive nature of plaintiffs' claim is inconsistent with the federal poli-
cy underlying RICO, it should not be displaced simply because
plaintiffs base their claim on a federal statute."45 The Third Cir-
(citations omitted)); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 604 (1974); Board of
Regents v: Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); Milens v. Richmond Redev. Agency, 665 F.2d
906, 909 (9th Cir. 1982) (We look to "state law to determine what property rights ex-
ist . . . ."); but see Berg v. First State Ins. Co., 915 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1990). In Berg,
the court concluded that an insurance policy constituted property under RICO. Howev-
er, the court did not solely look to state law but referred to California law and prior
Ninth Circuit bankruptcy precedent. Id. at 464 (referring to In re Minoco Group of Cos.,
Ltd., 799 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1986) and In re Mendenhall's Estate, 6 Cal. Rptr. 45,
47 (Cal. Ct. App. 1960)).
42 Leach v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 860 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1988), cet denied,
491 U.S. 905 (1989); see also In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 916 F.2d 874, 879 (3d Cir. 1990)
(citing Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 480 (1979)); Flynn v. Merrick, 881 F.2d 446, 450
(7th Cir. 1989); Crocker v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 826 F.2d 347, 349 (5th. Cir. 1989),
ert denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1988). However, several courts have simply referred to general
corporate law without explanation. See e.g., Rylewicz v. Beaton Servs. Ltd., 88 F.2d 1175,
1179 (7th Cir. 1989);, Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635, 640 (9th Cir.
1988); Roeder v. Alpha Indus., Inc., 814 F.2d 22, 29 (Ist Cfr. 1987); but see Rand v. Ana-
conda-Ericcson, Inc., 794 F.2d 843, 849 (2nd Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 987 (1986)
(referring to antitrust law).
43 860 F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 905 (1989).
44 Id. at 1274 n.14 (referring to Recon. Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204
(1946)).
45 In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 916 F.2d 874, 879 (3d Cir. 1990) (referring to Burks v.
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cuit noted the benefits of such an approach: "Absent inconsistency
with federal policy, federal courts are relieved 'of the necessity to
fashion an entire body of federal corporate law out of whole
cloth."'46 Likewise, the courts need not fashion a body of federal
property law under RICO. Indeed, recognizing the tenants' claim
is consistent with RICO's deterrent goal.47 Thus, because RICO is
silent on the definition of property and federal courts have looked
to state law in other RICO areas, the Oscar court appropriately de-
termined the existence of a property interest according to Califor-
nia law.48
Under California law, a tenant has a proprietary interest in a
leasehold. "A lease has a dual character. It is a conveyance of an
estate in the land and a contract between the lessor and the lessee
for the possession and use of the property in consideration of
rent."49 Although it is not real property itself, a lease is an estate
in real property.0 The tenant can maintain an action for injury
to the leasehold5 ' because any interest constituting a property
interest provides sufficient standing to sue for interference with
the enjoyment of the property.52 The tenant's claim for injury to
the property interest is distinct from the right of the landlord to
maintain an action for injury to the reversion." Therefore, under
California law the tenants have an adequate property interest for
section 1964(c) standing.54
Lasker, 441 U.S. 471, 478-79 (1979)).
46 Id (citing Burks, 441 U.S. at 480.).
47 See Oversight on Civil RICO Suits: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
99th Cong., 1st Sess. 140-41 (1985) for a discussion of RICO's deterrent goal. Additional-
ly, property should be interpreted expansively in light of Congress' mandate to construe
RICO broadly. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84
Stat. 922, 947 (1970).
48 Although the defendants argued that plaintiffs had no RICO injury because
plaintiffs' property was not commercial, both the majority and the dissent agreed that a
competitive injury is not required. Oscar v. University Students Coop. Ass'n, 939 F.2d
808, 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1991); see also Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497
n.15 (1985).
49 Parker v. Superior Court, 88 Cal. Rptr. 352, 354 (Cal. CL App. 1970).
50 Id.
51 Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 99 Cal. Rptr. 350, 356 (Cal. CL App.
1971)(citations omitted); 42 CAL. JUR. 3d § 54 (1978) (protection of property rights).
52 Venuto, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 356; Institoris v. City of Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 418,
424 (Cal. CL App. 1989); Buchanan v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist., 128 Cal.
Rptr. 770 (Cal. CL App. 1976).
53 Both the landlord and tenant have distinct property interests. The landlord's
property interest rests in the reversion and the tenant's property interest rests in the
present possessory right. See Hayden v. Consolidated Mining & Dredging Co., 84 P. 422
(Cal. CL App. 1906).
54 Judge Rymer, dissenting, argued that a "tenant's right to quiet enjoyment derives
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B. Causation
Once plaintiffs have shown the existence of a property right,
the next requirement for standing to sue under civil RICO is
proof that a property injury was caused "by reason of" a section
1962 violation.55 The Supreme Court elaborated on this causation
requirement in Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co.5" The Court stated
that "the' compensable injury necessarily is the harm caused by the
predicate acts sufficiently related to constitute a pattern .. .
Further, "[a]ny recoverable damages occurring by reason of a
violation of § 1962(c) will flow from the commission of the predi-
cate acts."58
Lower courts have given the causation requirement various
interpretations.59 One line of cases focuses on whether the racke-
teering activity causes a direct or indirect injury to the plaintiff.'
solely from a warranty by the lessor, against her own acts ... ." Oscar v. University Stu-
dents Coop. Ass'n, 939 F.2d 808, 814 (9th Cir. 1991). Under CAL. CIv. CODE § 1927
(West 1985), the lessor covenants against acts which interfere with the quiet enjoyment
of the lessee. The covenant covers only the lessor's acts, not third party's acts. See also
Marchese v. Standard Realty & Dev. Co., 141 Cal. Rptr. 370, 374 (Cal. Ct App. 1977)
(citing Carty v. Blauth, 147 P. 949 (Cal. 1915)); Lost Key Mines, Inc. v. Hamilton, 241
P.2d 273 (Cal. Ct. App. 1952). However, plaintiffs did not sue for the breach of a cove-
nant. Rather, plaintiffs sued'for disturbance of their common law property right to be
free from interference with the use and enjoyment of their property. A tenancy is a suffi-
cient interest for standing. Institoris, 258 Cal. Rptr. at 424. The right to use and enjoy-
ment of property arises from ownership of the property, not a covenant. Oscar, 939 F.2d
at 812 (referring to W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 87, at 619 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER & KEETON]); see also People v. Mason,
177 Cal. Rptr. 284, 287-88 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
55 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1988).
56 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
57 Id. at 497.
58 Id. (citation omitted). However, "[a] defendant who violates § 1962(c) is not
liable for treble damages to everyone he might have injured by other conduct, nor is the
defendant liable to those who have not been injured." Id. (citing Haroco, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 747 F.2d 384, 388 (1984), afd on other grounds,
473 U.S. 606 (1985)); see generally ABRAMS, supra note 36, at 138.
59 See Sperber v. Boeksy, 849 F.2d 60, 64 (2d Cir. 1988)("'[D]espite the manifold
attempts which have been made to clarify the subject [of proximate cause, there is not]
yet any general agreement as to the best approach' either in torts or as applied to RI-
CO.") (citations omitted).
60 See In re Sunrise Sec. Litig., 916 F.2d 874, 879 (3d Cir. 1990); Pujol v.
Shearson/Am. Express, "Inc., 829 F.2d 1201, 1205 (lst.Cir. 1987) (holding that predicate
acts did not directly cause whistleblower's job termination); Carter v. Berger, 777 F.2d
1173, 1176 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that higher county taxes did not confer standing on
taxpayers for RICO claim against criminals who bribed county officials); see also Laura
Ginger, Causation and Civil RICO Standing. Wien is a Plaintiff Injured "By Reason oJf a
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Another line rejects this distinction and focuses on whether prox-
imate cause can be proven between the injury and the action. 61
One reason for the rejection of the direct-indirect injury require-
ment is that it is too "restrictive."62 Indeed, RICO does not dis-
tinguish between direct and indirect injuries which flow from the
predicate acts.' Rather, the question is whether the injury itself
flows from the commission of the predicate acts.6
In Oscar, the court followed previous Ninth Circuit prece-
dent' and applied the proximate causation line of analysis. The
court held that plaintiffs had adequately pleaded causation:
[T]he racketeering conduct complained of was the direct cause
of the alleged injuries. According to the complaint, the racke-
teers themselves interfered with plaintiffs' use and enjoyment
by distributing narcotics on and around plaintiffs' property.
Furthermore, plaintiffs alleged that overdose victims languished
about the neighborhood because the racketeers were trying to
conceal their illegal conduct. The injury was thus the direct
consequence of the racketeering activity; there were no inter-
RICO Violation, 64 ST. JoHN's L. REv. 849, 858-59 (1990).
61 See Zervas v. Faulkner, 861 F.2d 823, 832-35 (5th Cir. 1988); Brandenburg v.
Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1187-90 (4th Cir. 1988); Sperber, 849 F.2d at 64; Haroco, Inc. v.
American Nat'I Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 398 (7th Cir. 1984) ('This causation re-
quirement might not be subtle, elegant or imaginative, but ... it is based on a straight-
forward reading of the statute as Congress intended it to be read."), affid on other
grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
62 "A requirement that the nexus between the injury and a predicate act be 'direct'
may, at least in some circumstances, be overly restrictive." Zewas, 861 F.2d at 833. "In
Sedima, the Court, in a footnote to its statement that recoverable damages are those
which 'flow from the commission of the predicate acts,' stated that '[s]uch damages in-
clude, but are not limited to, the sort of competitive injury for which the dissenters
would allow recovery.'" Id. (citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 497 n.15
(1985)). A competitive injury example given in the dissent is "that of a business which
conducts its affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity 'to enhance its profits or
perpetuate its economic power,' in which event 'competitors of that enterprise could
bring civil RICO actions alleging injury by reason of the enhanced commercial position
the enterprise has obtained from its unlawful acts.'" Id. (citing Sedima, 473 U.S. at 522.).
Under a strict interpretation of the direct/indirect causation analysis, the competitor
would not be able to recover as the competitor was injured indirectly.
63 See Alexander Grant & Co. v. Tiffany Indus., Inc., 770 F.2d 717, 719 (8th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986).
64 See Bass v. Champagnone, 838 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir. 1988).
65 Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Vigman, 908 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1990), cert.
granted sub nom. Holmes v. Securities Investor Protection Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1618 (1991).
In Vigman, a case involving securities fraud, the court stated that plaintiffs "must establish
a causal connection between the alleged predicate acts of securities fraud and the losses
they seek to recover. But in doing so, they need satisfy only the requirements of proxi-
mate cause as understood in a typical tort claim." Id. at 1468.
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vening causes or actors, and the harm was strictly foreseeable.
The blighting of a neighborhood by the fallout from a racke-
teering enterprise seems to be the type of harm well within the
contemplation of the statutory drafters. Causation was adequate-
ly pleaded.'
To prove causation, the plaintiffs must show "factual (but for)
causation and . . . legal (proximate) causation of the alleged inju-
ry. " 7 However, proximate cause limits legal liability stemming
from factual causation through the use of "a policy. . . 'whether
the conduct has been so significant and important a cause that
the defendant should be held responsible."'6 Proximate cause
factors include foreseeability of the harm, intervening causes, and
direct causality.69
66 Oscar v. University Students Coop. Ass'n, 939 F.2d 808, 813 (9th Cir. 1991). The
court also stated:
The complaint alleges that residents of Barrington Hall conducted drug sales
and posted look-outs in front of plaintiffs' apartments and in their carports.
This, they contend, interfered with the use and enjoyment of their property by
making them fear for their safety and by making it appear that their apartments
were a source of drugs .... In addition, they claim that Barrington Hall's resi-
dents regularly disposed of overdose victims by dumping them in front of the
building instead of summoning emergency assistance, all in an effort to conceal
their nefarious activities.
Id.
67 Ocean Energy II v. Alexander & Alexander, Inc., 868 F.2d 740, 744 (5th Cir.
1989). See Norman v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 873 F.2d 634 (2d Cir. 1989); Old
Time Enter. v. International Coffee Corp., 862 F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir. 1989);
Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179 (4th Cir. 1988); Grantham & Mann, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Safety Prods., Inc., 831 F.2d 596, 606 (6th Cir. 1987).
Also, in PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 54, § 41, at 264 the authors state:
Proximate cause ... is merely the limitation which the courts have placed upon
the actor's responsibility for the consequences of the actor's conduct. In a philo-
sophical sense, the consequences of an act go forward to eternity, and the
causes of an event go back to the dawn of human events, and beyond but any
attempt to impose responsibility upon such a basis would result in infinite liabili-
ty for all wrongful acts .... As a practical matter, legal responsibility must be
limited to those causes which are so closely connected with the result and of
such significance that the law is justified in imposing liability.
Id.
Proximate cause includes cause-in-fact and legal cause. With regard to legal cause,
many courts use the "but for" test. At most, the but for test is a rule of exclusion. If the
plaintiff shows but for causation, further analysis is necessary to determine if, as a policy
issue, liability should be imposed. However, if the but for test is not met, proximate
cause does not exist. Id. § 41, at 266.
68 Id. (quoting PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 54,-§ 42, at 272).
69 Brandenburg v. Seidel, 859 F.2d 1179, 1189. The restatement adopted the sub-
stantial factor test to determine legal cause. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431
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Plaintiffs adequately pleaded cause-in-fact because no, inter-
vening causes existed and plaintiffs would not have lost the use
and enjoyment of their property but for the defendants' drug activ-
ity. Also, as a policy matter, the Ninth Circuit (en banc) should
affirm the Oscar holding that plaintiffs adequately pleaded causa-
tion. The drug activity is closely connected to the interference
with the use and enjoyment of the property and Congress specifi-
cally wanted to eradicate drug activity.7' Furthermore, imposing
(1965). To determine whether a causal factor constitutes a substantial factor consider
(a) the number of other factors which contribute in producing the harm and
the extent of the effect which they have in producing it; (b) whether the actor's
conduct has created a force or series of forces which are in continuous and
active operation up to the time of the harm, or has created a situation harmless
unless acted upon by other forces for which the actor is not responsible; (c)
lapse of time.
Id. § 433.
The substantial factor causation requirement would.not change the causation analy-
sis in Oscar. Defendants' drug activities are the direct and only cause of the interference
with the plaintiffs' property interest.
70 115 CONG. REc. 5873 (1969) (statement of Sen. McClellan) ("Next to professional
gambling, most law-enforcement officials agree that the importation and distribution of
narcotics, chiefly heroin, is organized crime's major illegal activity."); see aso
116 CONG. REc. 35199 (1969) (statement of Rep. St. Germaln on S.30):
The profits from gambling and usurious loans go into financing the deadly nar-
cotics trade, and the profits here at the importing and wholesaling ends are as
astronomical as is the cost paid for this traffic by society-in terms of human
lives and the street crime motivated by the addicts' need for money to buy
drugs.
Id.
The Ninth Circuit stated that the activities at Barrington Hall were
the type of unlawful conduct that lies at the heart of RICO: the sale of illegal
drugs and the crime and violence associated therewith. This is not a case where
an enterprising lawyer has converted a business tort into a federal case; nor is it
an ordinary landlord-tenant dispute run amok. Instead, plaintiffs allege precisely
the type of conduct RICO was meant to deter-the continuous operation of a
drug distribution enterprise.
Oscar v. University Students Coop. Ass'n, 939 F.2d 808, 813 (9th Cir. 1991) (citation
omitted).
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liability will strengthen RICO's deterrent effect. 1 Thus, as a poli-
71 Indeed, the Supreme Court stated, "[pirivate attorney general provisions such as §
1964(c) are in part designed to fill prosecutorial gaps." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,
478 U.S. 479, 493 (1985).
As a policy matter, holding the defendants liable would further RICO's deterrent
goal. In hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Assistant Attorney General Ste-
yen S. Trott stated:
[In gauging 'the overall deterrent value of auxiliary enforcement by private
plaintiffs, the deterrence provided by the mere threat of private suits must be
added to the deterrence supplied by the suits that are actually filed. Further-
more, as the federal government's enforcement efforts continue to weaken or-
ganized crime and dispel the myths of invulnerability that have long surrounded
and protected its members, private plaintiffs may become more willing to pursue
RICO's attractive civil remedies in organized crime contexts .... Finally, dvil
PCO's utility against continuous large-scale criminality not involving traditional orga-
nized crime elements should be kept in mind. These, considerations suggest that pri-
vate civil RICO enforcement in areas of the organized crirhinality may have had
a greater deterrent impact than is commonly recognized, and . . . might be ex-
pected to produce even greater deterrence in the future.
Oversight on Civil RICO Suits: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. 140-41 (1985)(emphasis added). Indeed, the treble damage incentive encourages
citizens to bring private claims against defendants engaged in racketeering activities. In
Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1984), aff'd
473 U.S. 606 (1985), the court stated:
The delays, expense and uncertainties of litigation often compel plaintiffi to
settle completely valid claims for a mere fraction of their value. By adding to
the settlement value of such valid claims in certain cases clearly involving crimi-
nal conduct, RICO may arguably promote more complete satisfaction of
plaintiffs' claims without facilitating indefensible windfalls.
Id. at 899 n.16.
Further, RICO claims also deter future violators.
The law assumes that those who come before it are equal; this assumption,
however, is only formally true. It is a sad fact that the relatively wealthy perpe-
trator is usually able to buy the claim of the relatively poor victim at a substan-
tial discount of any figure that approaches justice .... Apparently, most victims
are willing to settle when they are made whole and do not want to litigate for
the premium . . . . Ironically, it may be necessary to authorize treble damages
recovery merely to assure that deserving victims of patterns of unlawful behavior
under RICO receive something close to actual damages ....
Clearly, authorizing treble damages and attorney's fees changes the litiga-
tion equation. Appropriately, it raises the price of settlements. Clear winners will
be settled quickly and for more than they would be otherwise. Trial time and
other judicial resources will be saved. Clear losers may be worth more than
nothing, but because they will always remain high risk ventures, they seldom will
be brought. Middle area litigation is more apt to be brought, and will be worth
more, but the issue, in both cases, remains whether a higher settlement is un-
just.
Blakey & Perry, supra note 3, at 920-21 n. 189 (citations omitted); see also Russello v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 28 (1983). But see Philip A. Lacovara & Geoffrey F. Aronow,
The Legal Shakedown of Legitimate Business People. The Runaway Provisions of Private Civil
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cy matter, legal causation exists.
C. Analyzing the Dissent
Under RICO, the harm caused by the predicate acts establish-
es the damages recoverable. 72 Also, the damages must be "estab-
lished by competent proof . . . .,7 However, few RICO cases
have reached the damages stage.
Judge Rymer, dissenting in Oscar, argued that plaintiffs' RICO
claim failed because they were unable to allege financial harm.74
The majority responded that "the requirement that plaintiffs have
a financial interest has no independent statutory significance; it is
merely another way of articulating the requirement that plaintiffs
must suffer an injury to property. Under California law, a thing
may be property even if it is not marketable . ... ' Therefore,
the majority held that plaintiffs could recover the "diminution of
the fair market value of their property interest."76
No RICO precedent establishes the damages which are recov-
erable for interference with the use and enjoyment of -property.
Because neither RICO itself nor case law provide damage analysis
for an interference with the use and enjoyment of property, the
RICO, 21 NEw ENG. L. REV. 1, 37 ("Indeed, it would be foolish to believe that a private
citizen would have the temerity to sue a real organized crime figure for racketeer-
ing. . . ."); Geoffrey F. Aronow, In Defense of Sausage Reform Legislative Changes to Civil
RICO, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 964, 974 (1990). The author states
[e]veryone concedes that the statute does not provide an effective weapon
for private parties to sue that type of defendant [organized crime] . . . . It
borders on the absurd to think that a private citizen would have the resources,
the necessary access to information and cooperative witnesses, or the temerity to
sue serious organized crime figures-absent at least prior government prosecution.
Id.
72 Sedima, 473 U.S. at 495.
73 Fleischhauer v. Feltner, 879 F.2d 1290, 1299 (6th Cir. 1989), cert denied, 110 S. Ct
1122 (1990), and cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 1473 (1990); see also Cuzzupe v. Paparone Realty
Co., 596 F. Supp. 988-91 (D.N.J. 1984) (Plaintiffs may recover only for business or prop-
erty damages that are sustained.).
74 Oscar, 939 F.2d at 814 (Rymer, J., dissenting) (citing Berg v. First State Ins. Co.,
915 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1990)). In Berg, the court dismissed a RICO claim by corporate
directors for wrongful cancellation of an insurance policy. Although the insurance policy
constituted property under RICO, the court dismissed the claim for lack of injury to the
property because the directors did not pay any claims while the policy was canceled. Id.
at 464. Rather, the directors claimed recovery for emotional distress stemming from the
cancellation of their insurance policies and potential losses.
75 Oscar, 939 F.2d at 812 n.5 (citing 4 B.E. WrrKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW §
3, at 10 (9th ed. 1987)).
76 Id. at 812 (footnote omitted). Actually, plaintiffs live in a rent-controlled district
and therefore the rent control statute sets the market price.
[Vol. 67:799
1992] COMMENT-OSCAR v. UNIVERSITY STUDENTS COOPERATIVE ASS'N 815
court should look to state law for guidance.7 7 Under state law, in-
terference with the use and enjoyment of property is a nui-
sance.'8 Thus, by analogy, the court should look to nuisance law
to determine the recoverable damages.
Recovery for a temporary nuisance 79 is the "temporary de-
crease in the value of the use of the property while the nuisance
is continued."0 The Oscar majority stated that the diminution in
fair market value determines the recovery. 1 However, plaintiffs
live in a rent controlled district and therefore the lease has no
fair "market" value. Rather, the rent control ordinance acts as a
substitute for the market. Assuming plaintiffs rented their apart-
ments for the base rental price under the ordinance, the dimi-
nution in rental value below the base rental price establishes the
damages recoverable. Therefore, plaintiffs incurred financial harm
to their property, not merely personal injuries, and the Ninth
Circuit (en banc) should hold that plaintiffs have adequately
pleaded damages.8
2
77 See County of Cook v. Lynch, 620 F. Supp. 1256 (E.D. Ill. 1985). In Lynch, to
determine a RICO damage recovery, the court analogized to the remedy provided under
Illinois law for tortious interference with contract. Id. at 1257.
78 CAL. Civ. CODE § 3479 (West 1970).
79 If a nuisance can be abated, the nuisance is temporary. Baker v. Burbank-
Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 705 P.2d 866 (Cal. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1017
(1986); Phillips v. Pasadena, 162 P.2d 625, 626 (Cal. 1945); Guttinger v. Calaveras Ce-
ment Co., 325 P.2d 145, 147 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958). Because the drug dealing could be
stopped at any time, the nuisance was temporary. Indeed, Barrington Hall is currently
closed. See Henry Weinstein, Use of Racketeering Law in Tenant Lawsuit Upheld LA. TIMES,
July 27, 1991, at AI; Berkeley Tenants Allowed to Sue Under RICO Law[-JRuling May Expand
Use of Racketeer Statute S.F. CHRON, July 27, 1991, at A13.
80 Spaulding v. Cameron, 239 P.2d 625, 629 (Cal. 1952); Qualls v. Smyth, 307 P.2d
29, 30 (Cal. Ct. App. 1957) ("'The measure of damage involved was the depreciation of
the rental or use value of the property .... "); Guttinger v. Calaveras Cement Co., 233
P.2d 914, 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951) ("difference in the rental or usable value of the pre-
mises before and after the injury"); Ingram v. Gridley, 224 P.2d 798, 802 (Cal. Ct. App.
1951) (If "value of [the property's] use only is affected, it has been held that the mea-
sure of damages is the depreciation in the rental value of the property.") (citations omit-
ted).
81 Oscar v. University Students Coop. Ass'n, 939 F.2d 808, 812 (9th Cir. 1991).
82 Although both the majority and dissent indicate that the plaintiffs are unable to
sublet their leaseholds, id. at 812 n.5, 815 n.5, the Berkeley Rent Control ordinance does
not prohibit subletting. In fhct, the ordinance, which states, that a tenant includes "any
renter, any tenant, subtenant, lessee, or sublessee of a rental unit, or successor to a
renter's interest or any group of tenants, subtenants, lessees, or sublessees of any rental
unit, or any other person entitled to the use or occupancy of such rental unit" contem-
plates the resale of the tenancy. BERKELEY, CAL., CODE § 13.76.040(I) (1990). If plaintiffs
sublet, they would actually fall within the ordinance's definition of a landlord. Id. §
13.76.040(D). In fact, the sole subletting limitation is that plaintiffs could not charge a
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
Judge Rymer, dissenting, concluded that plaintiffs did not
incur any financial harm and therefore did not have standing
under RICO. In fact, Judge Rymer urged that the plaintiffs' only
recovery was in state court for nuisance.83 In California a nui-
sance is "[a]nything . . . injurious to health, or ... indecent or
offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of prop-
erty, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or
property ... "84 There are two types of nuisances: public and
private. A public nuisance "affects at the same time an entire
community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of per-
sons 8.... 5 However, private citizens may bring a public nui-
sance action for damages if it is specially injurious to the citi-
zen. 8 To be specially injurious, a private citizen must establish an
inhry different in kh d from injury suffered by the rest of the
public. Nevertheless, even if a citizen does not have an injury
different in kind, a private citizen can maintain a private nuisance,
action against an activity that also constitutes a public nuisance8 7
if the citizen proves a disturbance of the citizen's rights in land
rather than an interference with the rights of the general pub-
lic.'a The landowner "does not lose his rights as a landowner
merely because others suffer damage of the same kind, or even of
the same degree." 89
If a house is used for drug activity, the house constitutes a
nuisance per se under California law.9" Either a public official or
rent above the base rental price. Id. § 13.76.100(A). The base rental price only sets a
maximum, not a minimum. Thus, plaintiffs can prove damage in the loss of rental value
if the pre-nuisance subletting price is grehter than the post-nuisance subletting price. See
also infra note 95.
83 Oscar, 939 F.2d at 814-15.
84 CAL. CM. CODE § 3479 (West 1970).
85 Id. § 3480. Remedies for a public nuisance include an injunction or damages. Id.
§ 3491.
86 Id. § 3493.
87 Venuto v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 99 Cal. Rptr. 350, 355 (Cal. Ct. App.
1971). Under CAL. Civ. CODE § 3481 (West 1970), a private nuisance is any nuisance
which is not a public nuisance. However, California case law allows recovery for a private
nuisance which is also a public nuisance. Venuto, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
88 Venuto, 99 Cal. Rptr. at 355.
89 Id. (citations omitted); see also Johnson v. V.D. Reduction Co., 164 P. 1119 (Cal.
1917); Fisher v. Zumwalt, 61 P. 82 (Cal. 1900); Lind v. City of San Luis Obispo, 42 P.
437 (Cal. 1895); Biber v. O'Brien, 32 P.2d 425 (Cal. CL App. 1934); Willson v. Edwards,
256 P. 239 (Cal. Ct. App. 1927).
90 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11570 (West 1991).
Every building or place used for the purpose of unlawfully selling, serving, stor-
ing, keeping, manufacturing, or giving away any controlled substance, precursor,
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a private citizen may bring an action to abate the nuisance and
the citizen can recover damages.91  Because Barrington Hall
residents' activities involved drug dealing, 2 .the activities satisfy
the statutory definition of a nuisance per se. Indeed, even if the
activities at Barrington Hall also constituted a public nuisance,
which it likely did because it affected so many people, plaintiffs
could maintain a private nuisance action because of their propri-
etary interest in the lease.93
Upon proof of a nuisance, plaintiffs can recover actual damag-
es.94 Plaintiffs could recover property damages for a decrease in
rental value95 as well as "damages for annoyance, inconvenience,
or analog specified in this division, and every building or place wherein or upon
which those acts take place, is a nuisance which shall be enjoined, abated, and
prevented, ahd for which damages may be recovered, whether it is a public or
private nuisahce.
Id.
A controlled substance is a "drug, substance, or immediate precursor which is listed
in any schedule in sections 11054, 11055, 11056, 11057, or 11058." CAL. HEALTH & SAFE-
TY CODE § 11007 (West 1991). These sections list several drugs, including opium, co-
caine, and depressants. Id. §§ 11055, 11056 (West 1991 & Supp. 1992).
91 Id. § 11570 (West 1991); Id. § 11571 (West Supp. 1991). Section 11571 states:
Whenever there is reason to believe that such a nuisance is kept, main-
tained or exists in any county, the district attorney of the county, in the name
of the people, may, or the city attorney of any incorporated city or of any city
and county, or any citizen of the state resident in the county, in his or her own
name, may, maintain an action to abate and prevent the nuisance and perpetu-
ally to enjoin the person conducting or maintaining it, and the owner, lessee, or
agent of the building or place, in or upon which the nuisance exists, from di-
rectly or indirectly maintaining or permitting the nuisance.
92 Oscar v. University Students Coop. Ass'n, 939 F.2d 808, 810 (9th Cir. 1991).
93 See Venuto v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas Corp., 99 Cal. Rptr. 350, 356 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1971); PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 54, § 90, at 648 ("It is likewise true where
there is any substantial interference with the plaintiff's use and enjoyment of his own
land, as where a bawdy house, which disturbs the public morals, also makes life disagree-
able in the house next door. This makes the nuisance a private as well as a public
one .... ").
94 CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 3333 (West 1970) ("[T]he measure of damages, except
where otherwise expressly provided by this Code, is the amount which will compensate
for all the detriment proximately caused thereby, whether it could have been anticipated
or not.").
95 See supra note 82. Judge Rymer, dissenting, argued that the tenants could only
recover for personal injuries, not property damages. Oscar, 939 F.2d 808. Judge Rymer
argued that the plaintiffs were legally incapable of renting their leaseholds, much less
renting for higher prices, because their apartments were located in a rent controlled
district. Id. at 815. Therefore, she concluded that the rental value was zero and could
not be diminished. Further, Judge Rymer urged that plaintiffs "allege only that '[a] rea-
sonable person would have a reduced desire to rent plaintiffs' apartments' in general,
not that the plaintiffs themselves were actually legally capable of renting. Indeed, given
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and discomfort,' . . . actual injuries to the land .... and costs
of minimizing future damages." 7 Thus, the plaintiffs have a state
law nuisance claim. However, RICO does not supersede state
law,9 8 and therefore plaintiffs can bring both a nuisance claim
for personal injuries and either a state nuisance claim or a RICO
claim for property damages.'
VI. CONCLUSION
Because RICO does not define property, the Oscar court ap-
propriately looked to California law to determine whether the
plaintiffs had a property interest in their leasehold. Further, the
defendants' drug-related activities interfered with the use and
enjoyment of plaintiffs' leasehold; and in fact, the defendants were
the sole cause of the diminution in value of the leasehold. As a
policy matter, the court should affirm the panel's decision that the
plaintiffs adequately pleaded an injury to their property caused by
the defendants' racketeering acts as Congress intended RICO to
address narcotic activities"° and imposing liability would further
that the apartments were rent controlled, the plaintiffs likely could not sublease them."
Id. at 815 n.5. However, nothing in the Berkeley rent control ordinance prohibits sub-
letting. See supra note 82. In fact, the rental value is not zero; the rental value is the
value at which the tenants could sublet. Thus, if a nuisance caused a reduced desire to
rent the leasehold and consequently a market reduction in the subletting price, the dimi-
nution in rental value reflects the property damages.
96 See also Acadia, California, Ltd. v. Herbert, 353 P.2d 294 (Cal. 1960); Quails v.
Smyth, 307 P.2d 29, 30 (Cal. CL App. 1957); but see Institoris v. City of Los Angeles, 258
Cal. Rptr. 418, 424 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) ("Emotional distress damages . . . are not avail-
able in an action on private nuisance.") (citation omitted).
97 San Jose v. Superior Court, 525 P.2d 701, 712 (Cal. 1974) (citations omitted).
98 Congress stated that "[n]othing in RICO shall supersede any provision of Federal,
State, or other law imposing criminal penalties or affording civil remedies in addition to
those provided" in RICO. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, §
904(b), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970).
99 Under RICO, neither abatement nor personal injuries are available. On the abate-
mnent issue, see Matek v. Murat, 862 F.2d 720, 733 (9th Cir. 1988) and Religious Tech-
nology Center v. Wollersheim, 796 F.2d 1076, 1084 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1103 (1987). For personal injury analysis see Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479,
509 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[T]he statute permits recovery only for injury to
business or property. It therefore excludes recovery for personal injuries."); see also Genty
v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 918-19 (3rd Cir. 1991); Fleischhauer v. Feltner,
879 F.2d 1290, 1300 (6th Cir. 1989); Rylewicz v. Beaton Services, Ltd., 888 F.2d 1175,
1180 (7th Cir. 1989); Grogan v. Platt, 835 F.2d 844, 846-47 (11th Cir 1988); Drake v.
B.F. Goodrich Co., 782 F.2d 638, 644 (6th Cir. 1986); Abrams, supra note 33, at 27-28
(1987).
100 See supra note 70.
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RICO's deterrent effect.1"1 The Oscar plaintiffs request only re-
covery for property damages caused by such drug dealing and
therefore the Oscar plaintiffs' should succeed on the dismissal mo-
tion.
Although plaintiffs can recover for personal injury under
nuisance law and for property damage under either nuisance law
or RICO, plaintiffs are not limited to a state law claim for proper-
ty damages because RICO does not supersede state law.102 RICO
is a valuable addition to the private citizen's fight against the inva-
sion of drugs in our neighborhoods arid the synergistic effect of
RICO combined with nuisance law will greatly enhance this fight.
The plaintiffs' claim is precisely within RICO's dominion, and
upon rehearing, the Ninth Circuit (en banc) should affirm the
Oscar panel decision.
MichelleJ. Stahl
101 See supra note 71.
102 See supra note 98.

